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1. Introduction
Diversity is becoming a pervasive feature of most societies. Yet, in spite of the
numerous gains from cultural differences within society, diversity often breeds segregation, which is detrimental to public goods provision. Segregation may occur along
one or a few lines such as ethnicity, religion, language, and income, and its main
aspect of limited social interactions across different groups is perceived to undermine the quality of public amenities and hamper public projects. There is robust
empirical evidence in the literature; in fact, amongst others, to quote Banerjee,
Iyer, and Somanathan (2005), it is “One of the most powerful hypotheses in political
economy. . .”.
The literature is furnished with a variety of mechanisms to explore the channels
through which segregation operates on public provision of public goods. The divergence in preferences across groups for public goods - languages of instruction at
school or the location of the highway - sharply dilutes the support for their provision
in Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) and restricts the choice of optimal funding
policies in Fernández and Levy (2008). Ethnic fragmentation also results in less
spending on education in Poterba (1997) and Goldin and Katz (1999) and reduces
growth in Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). Besley,
Pande, Rahman, and Rao (2004) show that leaders provide public goods essentially
to their ethnic groups, largely excluding others, while Vigdor (2004) observes a low
demand for public goods due to minimal altruistic preferences.
This paper investigates the private provision of public goods in segregated societies. In general, public goods are provided by both government and individuals.
Private contributions account for the provision of many important public goods
ranging from charitable education and health care to essential infrastructure. The
access to private contributions, however, may often be constrained by geographical location or social interactions, benefiting neighbors and acquaintances, while
effectively excluding others. A recent literature, by Bramoullé and Kranton (2007),
Bramoullé, Kranton, and D’Amours (2012), and Allouch (2012), has investigated
public goods games, where consumers may benefit only from neighbors’ provision,

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper803

2

Allouch: The Cost of Segregation in Social Networks

3

generalizing the standard model of private provision of pure public goods. In addition, Bloch and Zenginobuz (2007) examine a standard local public good model
with spillovers between jurisdictions, Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo, and
Yariv (2010) incorporate private information, Galeotti and Goyal (2010) investigate
issues of network formation, Rébillé and Richefort (2012) provide a welfare analysis,
and Elliott and Golub (2013) explore decentralized mechanisms for efficient provision. However, unlike the case of public provision, the implication of segregation for
private provision is unclear. On one hand, segregation may raise private provision
due to the strong feeling of solidarity within groups as found in Fong and Luttmer
(2009), but, on the other hand, it may decrease private provision due to the weak social attachments across groups as found in Miguel and Gugerty (2005). In addition,
while efficiency concerns generally provide a rationale for government intervention
in private markets, it remains to be seen whether such intervention is effective in
segregated societies.
We begin our analysis by investigating the impact of government intervention in
a society with an arbitrary but fixed network of social interactions. Government
intervention in private provision aims to achieve socially optimal outcomes, which is
very much in the spirit of the second welfare theorem, although, unlike competitive
equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium outcomes will typically be inefficient. The channel
of government intervention is lump-sum income redistribution, which plays a central
role in economics for achieving various redistributional goals, and is often employed
as a benchmark for other channels of intervention. The scale of income redistribution is crucial to our analysis since, similar to the private provision literature, we
focus on budget-balanced transfers of relatively small magnitude so that the set of
contributors remains unchanged. It is well known from Warr (1983) and Bergstrom,
Blume, and Varian (1986) that the private provision model of pure public goods is
subject to a strong neutrality result, whereby income redistribution has no effect on
either the aggregate provision of public goods or the consumption of private goods.1
1The

neutrality result, further analyzed in Bernheim (1986) and Andreoni (1989), is equivalent
to complete crowding-out, “dollar for dollar” for tax-financed government provision, which has
traditionally been the focus of much attention.
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Neutrality of income redistribution can be a serious problem for public goods that
rely mostly on private provision as it may limit the effectiveness of government intervention. In the case of local public goods, where not all consumers are necessarily
linked to each other, it is unclear how much of the income redistribution affects consumers’ welfare or, equivalently, how much of the government intervention is negated
by consumers’ actions. To this effect, we show that, under a standard utilitarian
approach, the impact of income redistribution on social welfare is determined by
the Bonacich centrality. Bonacich centrality, due to Bonacich (1987), is a vector
that measures power and prestige in social networks and is shown to be related
to the Nash equilibrium outcomes of a game by the key contribution of Ballester,
Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006).2 Quite different from the Nash–Bonacich linkage, Allouch (2012) shows that the impact of income redistribution on the aggregate
provision of public goods is also determined by the Bonacich centrality.
In order to compare the welfare impact of income redistribution across societies
of different sizes and different networks of social interactions, we introduce a new
index, called the Bonacich transfer index, which measures the potential per capita
welfare gain after income redistribution. Understandably, the proposed index is
closely related to the Bonacich centrality vector since it is the norm of its projection
on the hyperplane of budget-balanced transfers normalized by the size of the society.
Intuitively, the higher is the Bonacich transfer index, the more per capita welfare
gains may be achieved from income redistribution and, actually, in this regard, we
show that the index may take a wide range of values. For instance, for a society with
a regular network of social interactions the Bonacich transfer index is zero, whereas
for a society with a star network of social interactions the Bonacich transfer index
may be unbounded. Therefore, as developed, the Bonacich transfer index may be
thought of as a summary statistic of the efficacy of government intervention based
on the complex network of social interactions.
Finally, we further conduct our analysis of the welfare impact of government
intervention in segregated societies. Social interactions in segregated societies are
2Related

results include Candogan, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar (2010) for monopoly pricing and İlkiliç
(2011) for the tragedy of commons.
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represented by network structures, whereby the density of inward social ties for each
group is greater than the density of outward social ties. Segregation can emerge
from very different social processes and network formation dynamics. Schelling
(1969) provides a simple, yet powerful, model showing that very mild individual
preferences for having neighbors of the same type may lead to full segregation,
even though no individual prefers the final outcome. The case of strong individual
preferences is referred to as the homophily principle in sociology: the tendency of
individuals to disproportionally form social ties with others similar to themselves.
Homophily is a well-documented pattern of social networks and often called upon to
understand various social interactions such as friendship and marriage, job market
outcomes, speed of information diffusion, and even social mobility. There is an
emerging literature in the economics of social networks, by Currarini, Jackson, and
Pin (2009), Bramoullé, Currarini, Jackson, Pin, and Rodgers (2012), and Golub
and Jackson (2012), that models a random process of network formation strongly
influenced by homophily.
Our approach, although it is quite different, takes advantage of the insights of
the above-mentioned literatures, since we investigate societies with fixed network
structures of social interactions that already display segregation and not the matching processes nor the network formation dynamics leading to them. As such, the
Bonacich transfer index, developed in this paper, enables us to investigate the impact
of income redistribution on welfare in segregated societies with particular network
structures of social interactions. More specifically, our spectral analysis shows that
the Bonacich transfer index vanishes in large segregated societies, which implies
an “asymptotic neutrality” of income redistribution. Although this result mirrors
the widely-known neutrality result for pure public goods, it is quite different in interpretation. More specifically, the asymptotic neutrality, unlike neutrality, allows
for the possibility of income redistribution raising social welfare, but rules out the
possibility of it raising per capita welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the private provision of
public goods in networks. Section 3 relates the impact of income redistribution on
welfare to the Bonacich centrality vector. Section 4 introduces the Bonacich transfer
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index for a society with an arbitrary but fixed network of social interactions. Section
5 applies the Bonacich transfer index to segregated societies. Section 6 provides an
example of integrated versus segregated society meant to give an intuitive feel for
the proposed index. We conclude the paper in Section 7 and prove some of our
results in Section 8.

2. The model
We consider a society comprising n consumers embedded on a fixed network g
of social interactions. We denote by Ni consumer i = 1, . . . , n’s neighbors in the
network g. The preferences of each consumer i are represented by a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly quasi-concave utility function
ui (xi , qi + Q−i ), where xi is consumer i’s private good consumption, qi is consumer
P
i’s public good provision, and Q−i = j∈Ni qj is the sum of public good provisions of
consumer i’s neighbors in the society. Furthermore, the public good can be produced
from the private good via a unit-linear production technology. Therefore, the prices
of the private good and the public good can be normalized to p = (px , pQ ) = (1, 1).
Each consumer i faces the utility maximization problem
max ui (xi , qi + Q−i )
xi ,qi

s.t.

xi + qi = wi and qi ≥ 0,

where wi is his income (exogenously fixed). The utility maximization problem can
be represented equivalently as
max ui (xi , Qi )
xi ,Qi

(1)

s.t. xi + Qi = wi + Q−i and Qi ≥ Q−i ,
where consumer i chooses his (local) public good consumption, Qi = qi + Q−i . Let
γi be the Engel curve of consumer i. Then consumer i’s local public good demand
is
Qi = max{γi (wi + Q−i ), Q−i },
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or, equivalently,
qi = Qi − Q−i = max{γi (wi + Q−i ) − Q−i , 0}.

(2)

Let G = [gij ] denote the adjacency matrix of the network g, where gij = 1 indicates
that consumer i 6= j are neighbors and gij = 0 otherwise. The adjacency matrix of
the network, G, is symmetric with nonnegative entries and therefore has a complete
set of real eigenvalues (not necessarily distinct), denoted by λmax (G) = λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥
. . . ≥ λn = λmin (G), where λmax (G) is the largest eigenvalue and λmin (G) is the
lowest eigenvalue of G. By the Perron–Frobenius Theorem, it holds that λmax (G) ≥
−λmin (G) > 0.
We consider the following network-specific normality assumption:
Network normality. For each consumer i = 1, . . . , n, the Engel curve γi is differentiable and it holds that 1 +

1
λmin (G)

< γi0 (·) < 1.

Proposition 1. Assume network normality. Then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the private provision.
Proof. See Allouch (2012).
The network normality assumption amounts to both the normality of the private
good and a strong normality of the public good. The seminal contribution of
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) shows that the assumption that both the
private good and the public good are normal is sufficient to guarantee the existence
and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the standard model of private provision.
Bramoullé, Kranton, and D’Amours (2012) investigate the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in games of strategic substitutes on networks with linear
best-reply functions. More generally, their contribution shows that the lowest eigenvalue, λmin (G), is key to equilibrium analysis. Building on the above important
contributions, Allouch (2012) introduces the assumption of network normality and
establishes the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods on networks, which simultaneously extends Bergstrom, Blume,
and Varian (1986) to networks and Bramoullé, Kranton, and D’Amours (2012) to
nonlinear best-reply functions.
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3. Government intervention in private provision
This section investigates the impact of government intervention on private provision of public goods. The government aims to achieve socially optimal outcomes
by drawing on income redistribution as a policy instrument. Income redistribution
takes the form of lump-sum transfers, which are traditionally viewed as a reference
point for other policy instruments. We denote by a budget-balanced transfer, a
Pn
∗ T
∗
∗
t = (t1 , t2 , . . . , tn )T ∈ Rn such that
i=1 ti = 0. Let q = (q1 , . . . , qn ) denote
the Nash equilibrium corresponding to the income distribution w = (w1 , . . . , wn )T
and qt = (q1t , . . . , qnt )T denote the Nash equilibrium corresponding to the income
distribution w + t = (w1 + t1 , . . . , wn + tn )T . Similar to Warr (1983) and Bergstrom,
Blume, and Varian (1986), we will focus our analysis on income redistributions that
leave the set of contributors unchanged, and we will refer to them as “relatively
small”.
For simplicity, from now on we will focus our analysis on particular preferences:
Gorman polar form preferences.

There exists a real number a such that, for

each consumer i = 1, . . . , n, it holds that γi0 (·) = 1 − a.
Although the assumption of Gorman polar form preferences is quite restrictive, it
includes some interesting and important classes of preferences; for instance, both
Cobb–Douglas preferences and quasi-linear preferences with respect to a common
numeraire satisfy this assumption.
In general, there are compelling reasons for presuming that not all consumers
will be contributing to public goods. For simplicity also, passing to subnetworks if
necessary, we assume that all consumers are contributors.3 Finally, we will assume
throughout the paper network normality, which is equivalent to a ∈]0, − λmin1(G) [.
3.1. The Bonacich centrality measure. In the social networks literature, a variety of network measures have been proposed to explore the potential importance,
power, and influence of individuals (or institutions) in social interactions. The most
intuitive network measure is degree centrality, defined as the number of immediate
3Notice

that an income distribution almost proportional to the eigenvector centrality, the unique
unit eigenvector associated with λmax (G), will always lead to an interior Nash equilibrium.
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neighbors in the network, which gives importance to individuals with more connections. Obviously, the fact that degree centrality overlooks indirect influences from
distant neighbors gives rise to the use of rather global network measures. The key
contribution of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) relate the Nash equilibrium outcomes of a game to the Bonacich centrality, due to Bonacich (1987),
defined by
b(G, δ) = (I − δG)−1 1,
where I is the identity matrix, 1 is the n-dimensional vector with all components
equal to one, and δ is the attenuation parameter. Since for |δ| <
that
−1

b(G, δ) = (I − δG) 1 =

+∞
X

1
λmax (G)

it holds

δ k Gk 1

k=0

the Bonacich centrality of consumer i can be expressed as follows:
bi (G, δ) =

+∞
X
k=0

δ

k

n
X

(Gk )ij .

j=1

Given that (Gk )ij counts the total number of walks of length k emanating from i
and terminating at j, it follows that the Bonacich centrality of consumer i counts
the number of walks emanating from i discounted by δ to the power of their length.
Notice that the attenuation parameter δ captures the decay of influence of distant
consumers.
Quite different from the Nash–Bonacich linkage, Allouch (2012) shows that the
impact of income redistribution on the aggregate provision of public goods, Q =
Pn
i=1 qi , is related to a generalization of the Bonacich centrality. The following
proposition reproduces the result for the special case of preferences of the Gorman
polar form investigated in this paper.
Proposition 2. For any relatively small transfer t, it holds that
qt − q∗ = (1 − a)(I + aG)−1 t and hence Qt − Q∗ = (1 − a) b(G, −a) · t.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Remark 1. The assumption of network normality, needed for the uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium, may be relaxed and Proposition 2 still holds partially. Indeed, for
almost any a ∈]0, 1[, the matrix I + aG is invertible. Moreover, similar to Theorem
1 in Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), for a Nash equilibrium q∗ corresponding
to the income distribution w = (w1 , . . . , wn )T and any transfer of relatively small
magnitude t, it may be easily checked that qt = q∗ + (1 − a)(I + aG)−1 t is a Nash
equilibrium corresponding to the income distribution w +t = (w1 +t1 , . . . , wn +tn )T .
3.2. Welfare analysis. In order to investigate the welfare impact of income redistribution, we take a standard utilitarian approach. More specifically, we consider
the (indirect) social welfare function
def

SW(w) =

n
X

ui (x∗i , Q∗i ),

i=1

which is the sum of utilities achieved by consumers at the unique Nash equilibrium
with income distribution w = (w1 , . . . , wn ).
Proposition 3. Assume network normality. Then there exists a positive real number κ such that for any relatively small transfer t it holds that
SW(w + t) − SW(w) = −κ b(G, −a) · t.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that the impact of income redistribution on welfare is determined by the Bonacich centrality vector.
One of the most deeply ingrained ideas when thinking about public goods is
that they are always underprovided by a system of private provision. Surprisingly,
Propositions 2 and 3 show that the impacts of income redistribution on aggregate
provision and social welfare are determined by the Bonacich centrality vector, although by pulling the income redistribution in opposite directions. More precisely,
an income transfer carried out from a high Bonacich centrality consumer to a low
Bonacich centrality consumer always increases social welfare and decreases aggregate provision. As a consequence, one may conclude that when public goods are
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provided solely by voluntary contribution, raising social welfare and raising aggregate provision are sharply conflicting policy objectives.
The underlying economic intuition for the above observation may be explained as
follows. First, each consumer cares only about the sum of own and neighbors’ public
goods provision, which may well be different from the aggregate provision. Moreover, a second-best welfare maximization argument stipulates transferring income to
consumers that, due to their network position, face a low social cost to produce public goods. Understandably, such transfers of income simultaneously increase social
welfare and reduce aggregate provision.

2

1

3

Figure 1: The star network with three consumers
Example 1. Consider a society with three consumers and the star network of social
interactions described in Figure 1. The Bonacich centrality vector of the network of
social interactions for a ∈]0, − λmin1(G) [ is
b(G, −a) = (b1 (G, −a), b2 (G, −a), b3 (G, −a))T =

1
(1 − a, 1 − 2a, 1 − a)T .
1 − 2a2

We first observe that the ranking of consumers produced by the Bonacich centrality
vector is insensitive to the value of a. Indeed, consumers 1 and 3 are equally ranked
and always have a higher Bonacich centrality than consumer 2.
Moreover, given the network structure of social interactions, one may naturally
expect consumer 2 having the highest centrality in most network measures; however,
it is clear that the Bonacich centrality was not intended to capture the importance of
consumers but rather their social cost to produce public goods. For instance, starting
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from a private provision equilibrium where the three consumers are contributors, a
relatively small income transfer t = (t1 , t2 , t3 ) with t2 > 0 always raises social welfare
and decreases aggregate provision.
4. An economic index for income redistribution
4.1. The Bonacich transfer index. Our investigation shows that the Bonacich
centrality vector is key to understanding the impact of income redistribution on
welfare. In the following, we would like to compare the welfare impact of income
redistribution across societies of different sizes and different networks of social interactions. To be able to do so, we introduce a new network measure, called the
Bonacich transfer index, defined by
def

bT I (G, −a) = max
t∈BT

SW(w + t) − SW(w)
,
n

where BT = {t ∈ 1⊥ | ktk ≤ 1} denote the unit ball in the hyperplane of budgetbalanced transfers 1⊥ . The Bonacich transfer index measures the potential per capita
welfare gain per unit of redistribution for a society based on the network of social
interactions. This corresponds to an average utilitarian approach to welfare, which
is adequate to deal with a change in the size of the society.4
The following result shows that the Bonacich transfer index corresponds to the
norm of the projection of the Bonacich centrality vector on the hyperplane of budgetbalanced transfers 1⊥ normalized by the size of the society.
Proposition 4.
bT I (G, −a) =

κ
kproj1⊥ b(G, −a)k.
n

Proof. From Proposition 3 it follows that
SW(w + t) − SW(w) = −κ b(G, −a) · t = −κ (proj1⊥ b(G, −a)) · t.
If proj1⊥ b(G, −a) = 0 then the equality bT I (G, −a) =

κ
n

kproj1⊥ b(G, −a)k = 0

holds trivially. If proj1⊥ b(G, −a) 6= 0, the maximum of SW(w + t) − SW(w), for
4It

is worth noting that when the size of the society is fixed, the average utilitarian approach is
identical in its policy recommendations to the standard utilitarian approach.
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proj

b(G,−a)

t ∈ BT , occurs at − kproj1⊥⊥ b(G,−a)k . Hence
1

bT I (G, −a) = max
t∈BT

=

SW(w + t) − SW(w)
κ
proj1⊥ b(G, −a)
= − b(G, −a) · −
n
n
kproj1⊥ b(G, −a)k

κ kproj1⊥ b(G, −a)k2
κ
= kproj1⊥ b(G, −a)k.
n kproj1⊥ b(G, −a)k
n

4.2. Spectral analysis of the Bonacich transfer index. In this section, we
provide an alternative formulation for the Bonacich transfer index based on the
spectral analysis of the network of social interactions. More specifically, similar to
a recent result established by Allouch (2012) for the Bonacich centrality vector, we
show that the Bonacich transfer index may be expressed from a selection of the
spectrum5 of the network of social interactions. The intuition is as follows: the
Bonacich centrality vector is closely related to the number of walks in the network
of social interactions, which in turn is determined only by a subset of the eigenvalues
of the network of social interactions.
An eigenvalue µ of G, which has an associated eigenvector not orthogonal to
the vector 1, is said to be a main eigenvalue (Cvetković (1970)). By the Perron–
Frobenius Theorem, the maximum eigenvalue of G has an associated eigenvector
with all its entries positive and, therefore, is a main eigenvalue. The distinct main
eigenvalues, µ1 , µ2 , . . . , µs (µ1 > µ2 > . . . > µs ), of G form the main part of the
spectrum, denoted by M (Harary and Schwenk (1979)). The cosine of the angle
between the eigenspace of µi , EG (µi ), and the vector 1, denoted by βi , is called a
main angle of G. Obviously, µi is a main eigenvalue if and only if βi 6= 0. Moreover,
P
it holds that si=1 βi 2 = 1.
The following result shows that the Bonacich transfer index may be expressed
from the main part of the spectrum M.
Theorem 1.

v
u
s
s
X
u1 X
βi 2
βi 2 2
TI
)
−
(
) ).
b (G, −a) = κ t ((
n i=1 (1 + aµi )2
1
+
aµ
i
i=1

Proof. See the Appendix.
5Not

always a proper selection.
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The Bonacich transfer index has, in view of Theorem 1, a natural geometric
interpretation. Specifically, the Bonacich transfer index is related to the gap in
Jensen’s inequality6 for the convex function f (x) = x2 , applied to the convex com1
1
bination of 1+aµ
, 1 , . . . , 1+aµ
with weights β1 2 , β2 2 , . . . , βs 2 . Indeed, recall that
s
1 1+aµ2
Ps
2
i=1 βi = 1 and it may be easily checked that
v
u
s
s
X
u1 X
1
βi 2
2
TI
t
((
βi f (
)) − f (
)).
b (G, −a) = κ
n i=1
1 + aµi
1 + aµi
i=1

Corollary 1. bT I (G, −a) = 0 if and only if the network is regular.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 shows that a zero Bonacich transfer index characterizes regular networks.
Hence, a relatively small budget-balanced transfer will have no impact on welfare in
regular networks.
Notice that, since, in view of Proposition 2, the Bonacich transfer index may also
be related to the impact of income redistribution on aggregate provision, it follows
that regular networks are the only instance where the two policy objectives of raising
welfare and raising aggregate provision coincide as they are both redundant.
Corollary 2. If λmin (G) = µs , then
lim
bT I (G, −a) = +∞.
−1

a↑ λ

min(G)

Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 2 shows that the Bonacich transfer index may also be unbounded from
above, which, together with Corollary 1, implies that the Bonacich transfer index
may take a wide range of values.
Example 2. Consider a society with three consumers and the star network of social
interactions described in Figure 1. The adjacency matrix of the network of social
6Jensen’s

inequality is a central inequality in the study of convex functions.
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interactions is




0 1 0


.
G= 
1
0
1


0 1 0

The spectral decomposition shows that G has three distinct eigenvalues
√
√
λ1 = 2, λ2 = 0, and λ3 = − 2
with corresponding unit eigenvectors
√
√
√
√
1 2 1
2
2
1
2 1
v1 = ( ,
, ), v2 = (
, 0, −
), and v3 = ( , −
, ).
2 2 2
2
2
2
2 2
Obviously, unlike v1 and v3 , the sum of v2 coordinates is zero. Hence, the main part
√
√
of the spectrum is M = { 2, − 2}. Figure 2 provides the geometric interpretation
√

of the Bonacich transfer index for a ∈]0,

2
[.
2

f (x) = x2

3
(bT I )2
κ2

1√
1+a 2

1

1√
1−a 2

Figure 2: The Bonacich transfer index of a society with three consumers and a star
network of social interactions
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5. Segregated society
Now we investigate the impact of income redistribution in a society that is segregated across different groups. More specifically, the society is divided into H ≥ 2
non-empty and pairwise disjoint groups, C1 , . . . , CH , of consumers of similar attributes, which may involve, amongst other things, ethnicity, religion, language, and
income. Consumers may have neighbors from different groups and benefit equally
from their neighbors’ public goods provision regardless of their group identities.7
We introduce the following assumption on the network of social interactions of
the society:
Segregated society: Let Chi denote consumer i’s own group. Then,
(i) for each consumer i = 1, . . . , n,
|Ni ∩ Chi | >

X

|Ni ∩ Ch |;

h6=hi

(ii) if consumers i, j belong to the same group, that is Chi = Chj , then
|Ni ∩ Ch | = |Nj ∩ Ch |, for each h = 1, . . . , H.
The segregated society assumption is about the density of social ties between the
different groups of the society. Condition (i) stipulates that the number of social ties
each consumer has to consumers from his own group exceeds the number of social
ties he has to consumers from other groups. Condition (ii) is merely a network
regularity requirement. It stipulates that the number of social ties a consumer in
a given group has to consumers in any group is independent of the choice of the
consumer.
Theorem 2. Assume the society is segregated. Then bT I (G, −a) ≤

κ
√
.
2 n

Proof. Condition (ii) of segregated society implies that the partition π = {C1 , . . . , CH }
of consumers defines an equitable partition of the set of consumers (see Powers and
7Notice

that since, for ease of exposition, we assume that the network of social interactions g is
connected, we rule out the full segregation case, which corresponds to ∪i∈Ch Ni ⊂ Ch for a group
Ch .
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Sulaiman (1982) for a basic reference). An equitable partition gives rise to a quotient graph g/π characterized by the adjacency matrix G/π = [dlz ]1≤l,z≤H , where dlz
denotes the number of links from a consumer in group Cl to consumers in group Cz .8
Notice that the adjacency matrix, G/π, is not necessarily symmetric, since in general dlz 6= dzl . The quotient graph plays an important role in the study of the main
part of spectrum M since it holds that (see, for example, Cvetković, Rowlinson, and
Simić (1997), Theorems 2.4.3 and 2.4.5)
M ⊂ spec(G/π) ⊂ spec(G).

(3)

Observe that all the eigenvalues of G are real and so the eigenvalues of G/π are also
real. Moreover, condition (i) of segregated society implies that G/π is a diagonally
dominant matrix. From the Geršgorin Circle Theorem (see Varga (2004), Theorem
1.1), it follows that all eigenvalues of G/π are positive. From (3), one obtains
µi > 0 for each µi ∈ M. This implies that 0 <
Jensen’s gap is less than

1
4

1
1+aµi

< 1 for each µi ∈ M. Since the

(= max {x − x2 }), the maximum possible Jensen’s gap,
x∈]0,1[

it follows that
v
u
s
s
X
u1 X
βi 2
βi2
κ
TI
t
b (G, −a) = κ
((
)
−
(
)2 ) ≤ √ .
2
n i=1 (1 + aµi )
1 + aµi
2 n
i=1

Corollary 3. Assume the society is segregated. Then lim bT I (G, −a) = 0.
n→+∞

Proof. An immediate consequence of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 provides an upper bound for the Bonacich transfer index in a segregated
society. Corollary 3 shows that the Bonacich transfer index vanishes in large segregated societies, which suggests an asymptotic neutrality of income redistribution.
Albeit quite different in interpretation, this result mirrors the neutrality result for
pure public goods since it shows that social interactions in large segregated societies
may limit the impact of redistributive policies and, by the same token, a wide range
of other closely-related policies.
8Equitable

partitions are referred to as colorations while the quotient graph g/π is also known as

divisor.
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6. An example: integrated versus segregated society
We now provide an example to understand the welfare impact of income redistribution in an integrated versus segregated society. Consider a society comprising two
groups of consumers C1 and C2 of sizes, respectively, n1 and n2 such that n1 = 4n2
(note that the size of the society is n = n1 +n2 ). The society has a particular network
of social interactions g defined as follows. For each consumer in C1 , the number of
social ties to consumers from C1 is d and the number of social ties to consumers from
C2 is r. For each consumer in C2 , the number of social ties to consumers from C2 is
d and the number of social ties to consumers from C1 is (obviously) 4r. We assume
that the network g is connected, which implies r > 0. Let us consider the adjacency
matrix of the quotient graph g/π corresponding to the partition π = {C1 , C2 }:
!
d r
G/π =
.
4r d
Then, from (3) and the fact that the network g is not regular, it follows that G has
exactly two main eigenvalues, which are
λmax (G) = µ1 = d + 2r and µ2 = d − 2r.
6.1. Integrated society: d < r. For each consumer, the number of social ties to
consumers from his own group is smaller than the number of social ties to consumers
from the other group. Then it holds that
µ1 = d + 2r > 0 and µ2 = d − 2r < 0.
1
Hence, for a ∈]0, d+2r
[, it follows that

0<
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f (x) = x2

n
(bT I )2
κ2

1
1+aµ1

1

1
1+aµ2

Figure 3: The Bonacich transfer index of an integrated society
Observe that if d = 0 then we have a “fully” integrated society. Moreover, since
µ2 = −µ1 = −2r = λmin (G),
it follows from Corollary 2 that lim1 bT I (G, −a) = +∞.
a↑− µ

2

6.2. Segregated society: d > 4r. For each consumer, the number of social ties to
consumers from his own group is bigger than the number of social ties to consumers
from the other group. Then it holds that
µ1 = d + 2r > 0 and µ2 = d − 2r > 0.
1
[, it holds that
Hence, for a ∈]0, d+2r

0<
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f (x) = x2

n
(bT I )2
κ2

1
1+aµ1

1
1+aµ2

1

Figure 4: The Bonacich transfer index of a segregated society
The economic intuition for asymptotic neutrality in this simple example of a
segregated society may be explained as follows. First, due to their low social cost to
produce public goods, there are welfare gains from transferring income to consumers
in C2 . However, these welfare gains will be offset for consumers in C1 with both
an income reduction and, due to segregation, a limited benefit from the increased
public good provision by consumers in C2 . On balance, these different effects will
gradually, as society grows large, exhaust the potential per capita welfare gains and,
equivalently, cause the Bonacich transfer index to shrink to zero.
Finally, observe that if r = 0 (and d > 0) then, contrary to our assumption, the
network of social interactions is no longer connected. In this case, we have a fully
segregated society with two unconnected groups. We may deduce from Corollary 1
that the Bonacich transfer index is zero for each subsociety defined by a group.
7. Conclusion
Enhancing private provision of public goods has long been an important policy
objective and our paper shows that understanding social networks is a key way to
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achieve this. To this effect, the Bonacich transfer index, introduced in this paper, may be thought of as an instrument to capture the welfare multiplier effect
of income redistribution based on the complex network of social interactions. The
computation of the Bonacich transfer index shows that redistributive policies may
have a normative significance in integrated societies and may be welfare inconsequential in segregated societies. Surprisingly, the result is obtained only from the
network structure of social interactions since consumers care about their neighbors
only insofar as they affect public good provision and not their group identities.
Nevertheless, while undergoing the process of formation, the underlying network
structure of social interactions of a society may have been largely affected by the
linking preferences of consumers. Hence, a straightforward implication of our result
suggests that the optimal policy to increase the welfare multiplier effect of income
redistribution within a society, when building/reshuffling the network structure of
social interactions, stipulates fostering social bridges and outward social ties between
groups while discouraging homogenous and inward social ties within groups.

8. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. First, it follows from (2) that for each consumer i
qit − qi∗ = ((1 − a)(wi + ti + Qt−i ) − Qt−i ) − ((1 − a)(wi + Q∗−i ) − Q∗−i )
= (1 − a)ti − a(Qt−i − Q∗−i ).
Rearranging terms, it follows that (I + aG)(qt − q∗ ) = (1 − a)t, and therefore
qt − q∗ = (1 − a)(I + aG)−1 t.
Hence, it holds thatt
Q − Q∗ = 1 · (qt − q∗ ) = (1 − a)b(G, −a) · t.

Proof of Proposition 3. When preferences of consumers are of the Gorman polar
form, the indirect utility function for each consumer i, at given price p and income
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wi , can be written as
vi (p, wi ) = α(p)wi + βi (p),
where α(p) > 0 is common to all consumers. From the utility maximization in (1),
it follows that at the unique Nash equilibrium each consumer maximizes his utility
with respect to the price p = (1, 1) and the social income wi + Q∗−i . Therefore it
holds that
ui (x∗i , qi∗ + Q∗−i ) = vi (p, wi + Q∗−i ) = α(p)(wi + Q∗−i ) + βi (p).
Hence, it follows from Proposition 2 that
SW(w + t) − SW(w) =
=

n
X
i=1
n
X

[ui (xti , qit + Qt−i ) − ui (x∗i , qi∗ + Q∗−i )]
[α(p)(wi + ti + Qt−i ) − α(p)(wi + Q∗−i )]

i=1
n
n
n
X
X
X
t
∗
= α(p)[ (Q−i − Q−i ) +
ti ] = α(p)
(Qt−i − Q∗−i )

= α(p)

i=1
n
X

i=1

X

(qjt − qj∗ ) = α(p)

i=1
n
X

[G(qt − q∗ )]i

i=1

i=1 j∈Ni

= α(p)1 G(q − q ) = α(p)(1 − a)1T G(I + aG)−1 t
1
1
= α(p)(1 − a)1T (− I + (I + aG))(I + aG)−1 t
a
a
α(p)(1 − a) T
=
1 (−(I + aG)−1 + I)t
a
α(p)(1 − a) T
= −
1 (I + aG)−1 t.
a
T

Therefore, if one sets κ =

α(p)(1−a)
a

t

∗

> 0, the desired result follows, that is,

SW(w + t) − SW(w) = −κ b(G, −a) · t.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ui be the unit eigenvector of the main eigenvalue
µi orthogonal to EG (µi ) ∩ 1⊥ . The eigenvector ui is determined uniquely since we
choose βi = ui · √1n to be the cosine of the acute angle between EG (µi ) and 1. Let V
be a matrix whose columns, v1 , . . . , vn , are eigenvectors of G chosen to extend the
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eigenvectors u1 , . . . , us of G to an orthonormal basis of Rn . Therefore, G = VDVT ,
where D = diag(λ1 , . . . , λn ). Therefore, it holds that
b(G, −a) = (I + aG)−1 1 = V(I + aD)−1 VT 1
n
s
X
X
1 · vi
1 · ui
=
vi =
ui
1 + aλi
1 + aµi
i=1
i=1
s
√ X
=
n
i=1

βi
ui .
1 + aµi

From the Pythagorean theorem, it holds that
kb(G, −a)k2 = kproj1⊥ b(G, −a)k2 + kproj1 b(G, −a)k2 .
Hence, it follows that
κ2
κ2
2
kproj
(kb(G, −a)k2 − kproj1 b(G, −a))k2 )
⊥ b(G, −a)k =
1
2
2
n
n
s
s
2
X
X
κ
1 1
βi
βi
2
=
(nk
ui k − nk((
ui ) · √ ) √ k2 )
2
n
1 + aµi
1 + aµi
n n
i=1
i=1

bT I (G, −a)2 =

s
s
s
X
X
κ2 X βi
βi
βi 2 2 1 2
=
((
ui ) · (
ui ) − (
) k√ k )
n
1
+
aµ
1
+
aµ
1
+
aµ
n
i
i
i
i=1
i=1
i=1
s
s
X
βi 2
βi 2 2
κ2 X
) ).
((
)
−
(
=
2
n
(1
+
aµ
)
1
+
aµ
i
i
i=1
i=1

Therefore, it holds that
v
u
s
s
X
u1 X
βi 2
βi 2 2
TI
t
b (G, −a) = κ
(
)
−
(
) ).
n i=1 (1 + aµi )2
1 + aµi
i=1
Proof of Corollary 1. From the Jensen’s gap interpretation of the Bonacich
transfer index, it follows that bT I (G, −a) = 0 if and only if s = 1, which is equivalent
to β1 2 = 1. From the definition of main angles, it holds that β1 2 = 1 is equivalent
to

√1
n

is an eigenvalue of G, which is also equivalent to g is a regular network.
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Proof of Corollary 2. First, observe that if λmin (G) = µs then it follows that
µs < 0, which implies s ≥ 2. Moreover,
v
u
s
s
X
u1 X
βi 2
βi 2 2
TI
b (G, −a) = κ t ((
))
)
−
(
n i=1 (1 + aµi )2
1
+
aµ
i
i=1
v
u s−1
s−1
u1 X
X
κ
1 + aµs
2
2 1 + aµs 2
t
=
(
) + βs − (
+ βs 2 )2 ).
βi (
βi 2
1 + aµs
n i=1
1 + aµi
1
+
aµ
i
i=1
Obviously, s ≥ 2 implies that βs < 1. Therefore, it holds that
v
s
u s−1
s−1
u1 X
X 1 + aµs
βs 2 − βs 4
1 + aµs 2
) + βs 2 − (
+ βs 2 ) 2 ) =
> 0.
lim1 t (
βi 2 (
βi 2
n
1
+
aµ
1
+
aµ
n
a↑− µ
i
i
s
i=1
i=1
Hence it follows that
s
κ
a↑− µ 1 + aµs
s

lim
bT I (G, −a) = lim1
−1

a↑ λ

min (G)

βs 2 − βs 4
= +∞.
n
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